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 The impact of the CSRC Regulation No. 12-1996 on the credibility  
of Chinese IPO earnings forecasts 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines whether the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (the CSRC) 
Regulation No. 12-1996, Announcement of Some Rules on the Issuance of Shares, may 
enhance the credibility of management earnings forecasts in Chinese IPO prospectuses.  
Using a sample of 858 IPO earnings forecasts over the period 1991 to 2005, we find that 
earnings forecasts have been less optimistic and more accurate after the regulation was 
promulgated on December 26, 1996.  Overall, our findings suggest that the CSRC Regulation 
No. 12-1996 can improve the reliability of Chinese IPO earnings forecasts.  
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1.        Introduction  
           Management earnings forecasts contained in prospectuses for initial public offerings 
(IPOs) provide useful information about future firm performance.  However, IPO earnings 
forecasts are vulnerable to information asymmetry problems because information about an 
IPO firm is less available to the public than information about a listed firm, and management 
always have better knowledge about their firm’s future performance than outside investors.  
Moreover, the credibility of IPO earnings forecasts may be impaired by managerial 
opportunism.  For instance, management may have incentives to overestimate IPO earnings 
forecasts in order to raise more proceeds from the IPO.  A significant overestimation of IPO 
earnings forecasts may mislead investors, and is usually associated with an adverse market 
reaction and a potential legal liability.  Consequently, the credibility of IPO earnings 
forecasts is a topic of considerable interest to researchers, investors, and regulators.  
           Research into the reliability of management earnings forecasts in the U.S. started in 
early 1970s.  However, IPO earnings forecasts are hardly ever addressed in U.S. studies 
because earnings forecasts are rarely disclosed in U.S. IPO prospectuses.1  Most of prior 
research on IPO earnings forecasts uses data from British Commonwealth countries (Jelic, 
Saadouni, & Briston, 1998).  So far, fewer studies on management forecast reliability have 
been conducted for emerging markets, especially for China.  This study provides evidence on 
the reliability of Chinese IPO earnings forecasts.  We find that the mean forecast error and 
                                                 
1
            See McDonald (1973), Imhoff (1978), Jaggi (1980), Porter (1982), and Cameron (1982). 
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the mean absolute forecast error are 0.45% and 15.28%, respectively, for a sample of 858 
Chinese IPOs over the period 1991 to 2005.2  
           On December 26, 1996, the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (the CSRC) 
promulgated a regulation, Announcement of Some Rules on the Issuance of Shares (No. 12-
1996).  The Regulation No. 12-1996 (thereafter “the Regulation”) imposes penalties on firms 
whose IPO earnings forecasts are significantly overestimated in their IPO prospectuses.  
Specifically, the Regulation requires that IPO firms and their auditors must explain and 
apologize to the public in a CSRC designated newspaper if predicted earnings are 
overestimated by 10 - 20% compared to actual earnings.  IPO firms will be penalized if 
earnings forecasts are overestimated by more than 20% and the overestimation is deemed to 
be a fraudulent activity.  Auditors will also be penalized if they issue an inappropriate audit 
opinion on a client company’s IPO earnings forecasts.  The Regulation also prohibits IPO 
firms from using earnings forecasts as a basis for setting issuance price.  
           Although the Regulation was promulgated to improve the reliability of earnings 
forecasts in Chinese IPO prospectuses, it remains an empirical question because the legal 
enforcement infrastructure is weak in China.  Moreover, Chinese IPO firms are closely 
connected with the government, which may provide opportunities for them to override the 
Regulation.  Hence, whether the Regulation can enhance the reliability of earnings forecasts 
is an empirical question.  This study examines whether the Regulation has achieved its initial 
                                                 
2
            IPO earnings forecasts from some Commonwealth countries seem less accurate than Chinese IPO 
earnings forecasts.  For example, the mean absolute forecast error is 289% for the Australian forecasts (Hartnett, 
1993), 100% for the New Zealand forecasts (Mak, 1989), and 88% for the Canadian forecasts (Pedwell, 
Warsame, & Neu, 1994). 
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objective.  We find that the Regulation has been efficacious in reducing the overestimation of 
IPO earnings forecasts after it was promulgated on December 26, 1996.  We also document a 
significant improvement in earnings forecast accuracy resulting from the promulgation of the 
Regulation.    
           This study contributes to the literature in the following ways.  First, to the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first study to investigate whether a securities regulation in an emerging 
market can enhance the reliability of corporate financial disclosure.  Since there is rare 
research into the effects of securities regulations on corporate disclosure, the promulgation of 
the CSRC Regulation No. 12-1996 provides us an opportunity to enrich this research topic.  
Second, we document evidence on the efficacy of the CSRC Regulation No. 12-1996.  Our 
findings may provide implications for future regulation promulgation to the CSRC and other 
securities regulators of emerging markets.  Third, this study adds to prior research on the 
economic determinants of forecast accuracy.  Our study suggests some ex ante criteria for 
evaluating Chinese earnings forecast accuracy.    
           The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 introduces institutional 
background.  The third section develops hypotheses.  Section 4 discusses research design.  
Section 5 provides empirical results, Section 6 conducts additional analyses, and the paper 
concludes in the seventh section.  
 
2.         Institutional Background  
2.1      Corporate disclosure in Chinese IPO prospectuses  
            The Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (the CSRC), established in 1992 
under the State Council, is the official government authority that is responsible for the 
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formulation of information disclosure regulations in the Chinese securities markets.  On June 
12, 1993, the CSRC issued the first corporate disclosure regulation for public offering 
companies, Implementing Standards on Information Disclosure for Shares Public Offering 
Companies (No. 43-1993).  This regulation required that public offering companies should 
disclose information in their initial public offering prospectuses, annual reports, interim 
reports, and seasoned public offering prospectuses in accordance with the standards 
implemented by the CSRC.  
            According to the implementing standards, information to be disclosed in IPO 
prospectuses includes the issuance price of shares, amount of capital to be raised, total 
amount of share capital, intended application of the capital raised, certificate of capital 
verification, parties involved in the new issuing, risk and strategy, dividend policy, 
underwriting, company’s background, operational performance, report of asset appraisal, 
financial information, earnings forecasts, development plan, commitments and litigation, and 
so on.3    
            On January 7, 1997, the CSRC formalized the implementing standards into a 
regulation, Standards on the Content and Format of Information Disclosure for Shares 
Public Offering Companies: the Content and Format of IPO Prospectuses (No. 2-1997).  On 
March 15, 2001, the CSRC issued a new regulation on IPO prospectuses,  Standards on the 
Content and Format of Information Disclosure for Securities Public Offering Companies: 
IPO Prospectuses (No. 41-2001), to supersede the Regulation No. 2-1997.  The Regulation 
No. 41-2001 required that, in addition to the information required by the Regulation No. 2-
1997, IPO firms should also disclose their business and technology, industry competition and 
                                                 
3
            See Tang, Chow, and Cooper (1996). 
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related transactions, and corporate governance in their IPO prospectuses.  Moreover, the 
CSRC made a significant change regarding earnings forecast disclosure in the Regulation No. 
41-2001.  Specifically, the Regulation No. 2-1997 required that companies must disclose 
earnings forecasts in their IPO prospectuses, whereas according to the Regulation No. 41-
2001, companies have the option of not disclosing earnings forecasts in their IPO 
prospectuses.4 
 
2.2       The CSRC Regulation No. 12-1996 
            On December 26, 1996, the CSRC issued a regulation, Announcement of Some Rules 
on the Issuance of Shares (No. 12-1996).5  This regulation addresses issues related to share 
issuance, including the criteria for initial public offerings, use of the capital raised, 
revaluation of assets, earnings forecasts, determination of issuance price, trading of 
employee’s shares, issuance costs, and so on.  
            According to the CSRC Regulation No. 12-1996, IPO firms and their auditors must 
explain and apologize to the public in a CSRC designated newspaper if the predicted 
earnings in their IPO prospectuses are overestimated by 10 - 20% compared to the actual 
earnings.  Penalties will be imposed on the IPO firm if earnings forecasts are overestimated 
by more than 20% and the overestimation is deemed to be a fraudulent activity.  Auditors 
                                                 
4
            IPO firms who voluntarily disclose earnings forecasts in their prospectuses will be penalized by the 
CSRC based on the Regulation No.12-1996 (as discussed in Section 2.2.) if their earnings forecasts are 
significantly overstated compared to the actual earnings. Indeed, few IPO firms have disclosed earnings 
forecasts in their prospectuses after the Regulation No. 41-2001 became effective. 
5
            This regulation is currently effective. 
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will also be penalized if they issue an inappropriate audit opinion on a client company’s IPO 
earnings forecasts.  Further, the Regulation prohibits IPO firms from using earnings forecasts 
as a basis for determining issuance price.6     
            In 1997, the CSRC publicly denounced eight Chinese listed companies for 
significantly overestimating earnings forecasts in their IPO prospectuses.7  For instance, 
Zhongyan Tango applied a very high gross profit rate of 80% in developing earnings 
forecasts, whereas its average gross profit rate was 20% for the two years prior to the IPO 
year.  The company’s actual earnings for the IPO year were only 12.30 million yuan, 
compared to the predicted 49.97 million yuan in its IPO prospectus.  Other listed companies 
being publicly denounced by the CSRC in 1997 included Kaidi Silk, Lanlia Chenxiang, 
Shijiazhuang Quanye, Wuhan Twin-Tigers, Guhan Group, Huaya Paper, and Northeast 
Pharmaceutical.  
            In addition to the eight listed companies, three accounting firms were also penalized 
by the CSRC for their deceptions and frauds in conducting the audits of IPO earnings 
forecasts.  Specifically, Shenyang Certified Public Accountants received a disciplinary 
warning and a pecuniary penalty, and Beijing Certified Public Accountants and Shijiazhuang 
Certified Public Accountants were publicly denounced.  
 
                                                 
6
            IPO earnings forecasts provide forward-looking information about an IPO firm’s future cash flow, and 
thus affect corporate valuation reflected in stock prices (Miller & Modigliani 1961).  Hence, although not to be 
used in determining issuance price after the Regulation No.12-1996, IPO forecasts are still important for 
investors in making investing decisions.       
7
            See Qi, Wu, and Zhang (1998). 
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3.        Hypotheses Development              
           Effective on December 26, 1996, the CSRC Regulation No. 12-1996 was formulated 
because Chinese securities administrators were seriously concerned with the reliability of 
IPO earnings forecasts.  Under the Regulation, IPO firms are not allowed to use earnings 
forecasts as a basis for setting issuance price.  Moreover, any significant and opportunistic 
overestimation of earnings forecasts in IPO prospectuses will be penalized by the CSRC.  
The Regulation may influence both the benefits and the costs of overstating earnings 
forecasts.  Before the Regulation, earnings forecasts were allowed for setting issuance price.  
Hence, if earnings forecasts were overstated, the issuance price would also be exaggerated.  
The Regulation prohibits IPO firms from using earnings forecasts as a basis for determining 
issuance prices, thus reduces the instant benefits of overestimating earnings forecasts.   
The Regulation also increases the potential costs of overestimating earnings forecasts 
in at least three ways.  First, any penalty from the CSRC will lower the reputation of an IPO 
firm and its auditor, especially as the penalty is publicly announced.  Second, the stock 
markets will react adversely if an IPO firm is penalized for overstating earnings forecasts.  A 
decline in stock price will consequently reduce the wealth of a large number of shares owned 
by the management of the firm.  Further, it will be more difficult to obtain approval for 
seasoned equity offerings from the CSRC if a firm had once been penalized for a fraud.  
Seasoned equity offerings may be an important tunnel for Chinese listed firms to survive 
when incurring significant operating losses.  Overall, the CSRC Regulation No. 12-1996 
increases the costs and decreases the benefits of overstating earnings forecasts, and thus may 
mitigate opportunistic overestimation of earnings forecasts and enhance the reliability of the 
forecasts. 
 8 
            However, prior research shows that legal enforcement is different across countries 
(La Porta, Lopez-De-Silances, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998).  In countries with weak 
enforcement environments, a regulation may not be strictly enforced even though the 
regulation itself is well designed, and consequently, may not meet its initial objective.  
Moreover, Cai (2007, pp.7) argues that “the China Securities Regulatory Commission (the 
CSRC), the executive branch body that is responsible for enforcing the securities law, has 
also not proven to be effective, independent, or professional based upon international 
standards”.  Thus, the weak legal enforcement infrastructure in China may impair the 
efficacy of the CSRC Regulation No. 12-1996. 
           Prior research also suggests that political connections may relax regulatory oversight 
of a company in question (Faccio, 2006).  Politically connected firms are more likely to 
obtain assistance from the government (Faccio, Masulis, & McConnell, 2006).  Most of 
Chinese IPO companies were state-owned enterprises before they went public, and the 
majority of their shares are still owned by the government after initial public offerings.  Fan, 
Wong, and Zhang (2007) further find that about 27% of CEOs from a sample of 790 Chinese 
IPO firms are former or current government bureaucrats.  Overall, Chinese IPO firms are 
closely connected with the government, and thus may take advantage of the affiliated 
relationship to challenge the authority of the CSRC, a regulatory body that is also highly 
affiliated with the government.  Thus, the effectiveness of the CSRC regulation is 
questionable considering the prevalence of political connections between Chinese IPO firms 
and the government.      
           In summary, the CSRC Regulation No. 12-1996 may increase the reliability of IPO 
earnings forecasts as the costs (benefits) of opportunistic overestimation will be higher 
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(lower).  However, the positive impact of the regulation on forecast reliability might be 
attenuated due to the weak legal enforcement infrastructure and the solid political 
connections between IPO firms and the government.  Thus, whether the CSRC Regulation 
No. 12-1996 can enhance the reliability of IPO earnings forecasts is still an empirical 
question.  Based on the above discussions, we develop two hypotheses with regard to 
forecast bias and forecast accuracy, respectively: 
H1       IPO earnings forecasts have been less optimistic after the promulgation of the  
            Regulation than before. 
H2       IPO earnings forecasts have been more accurate after the promulgation of the  
            Regulation than before. 
 
4.         Research Design  
4.1       Sample selection     
            The sample of this study includes all Chinese IPOs over the period 1991 to 2005 that 
satisfy the following criteria: 
(1) IPO prospectuses are available on www.cnlist.com, a Chinese website that provides 
all information disclosed by Chinese listed companies,  
(2) Earnings forecasts for the IPO year are disclosed in the prospectuses, 
(3) Earnings forecasts for the IPO year are based on profit before tax (firms that only 
issued forecasts of net income are excluded from the sample),8 and  
                                                 
8
            Although the income tax rate is 33% for all non-public Chinese companies, it is not uniform and is 
determined by local tax authority after a firm is publicly listed.  The annual profit for the IPO year may be taxed 
on a post-IPO rate for the whole year, or be taxed on a pre-IPO rate for the pre-IPO period and on a post-IPO 
 10 
(4) Other data are available for analysis. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
      The above criteria yield the final sample consisting of 858 IPO firms over the period 
1991 to 2005.  Table 1, panel A reports the distribution of these sample firms by year.  A 
total of 313 and 545 firms went public before and after the end of 1996, respectively.  An 
interesting phenomenon is that only 62 IPO earnings forecasts were issued after 2000, 
suggesting that few Chinese IPO firms have been willing to disclose earnings forecasts in 
their prospectuses after the CSRC changed the mandatory disclosure of IPO earnings 
forecasts into a voluntary requirement on March 15, 2001.9  Table 1, panel B provides the 
distribution of sample firms by CRSC industry classification.  About 59% of our sample 
firms are manufacturing companies.  In addition, 502 out of the 858 sample firms are listed 
on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the other 356 firms are listed on the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange.         
 
4.2      Univariate analysis   
           The reliability of earnings forecasts can be decomposed into a bias component and an 
accuracy component.  Forecast bias for an IPO firm is measured by forecast error (FE), 
which is commonly defined as follows:10   
                                                                                                                                                       
rate for the rest of the year.  Hence, we use forecasts of profit before tax instead of forecasts of net income to 
avoid any impact due to changes in post-IPO tax policy on forecast reliability. 
9
            There are 54 IPO earnings forecasts disclosed after March 15, 2001 in our sample. 
10
            See McConomy (1998), Clarkson (2000), Hartnett and Romcke (2000), Lonkani and Firth (2005), El-
Rajabi and Gunasekaran (2006), etc. 
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                                  FE = (A – F) / │F│                                                                (1) 
where 
                        F = earnings forecast for the IPO year, 
                        A = actual earnings for the IPO year. 
We focus on earnings forecasts for the IPO year because many IPO firms did not issue 
forecasts for years after the IPO year.  A negative (positive) sign of FE indicates that 
earnings forecasts are overestimated (underestimated) for an IPO firm.  However, the average 
forecast error across firms may not accurately reflect the average size of forecast errors 
because negative and positive errors cancel each other out.  
            Following prior research, forecast accuracy for an IPO firm is measured by absolute 
forecast error (AFE), that is,  
                                 AFE = │A – F│ / │F│                                                            (2) 
Earnings forecasts with lower AFE are more accurate than forecasts with higher AFE. 
            We first conduct univariate analysis to test the two hypotheses about the effects of the 
CSRC Regulation No. 12-1996 on IPO forecast credibility.  Both forecast error (FE) and 
absolute forecast error (AFE) of IPO earnings forecasts issued after the end of 1996 are 
compared with those issued before the end of 1996.  We use the end of 1996 as the clear-cut 
date because the Regulation became effective as of December 26, 1996.  Both student t-tests 
and Wilcoxon tests are employed for the comparisons.  Using Wilcoxon tests can mitigate the 
potential effect of outliers on the results.  If the reliability of IPO earnings forecasts is 
significantly affected by the Regulation, the two hypotheses will not be statistically rejected.  
The two hypotheses are also tested by conducting regression analysis as described in the next 
subsection. 
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4.3      Regression analysis   
            We run the following pooled regression to test the two hypotheses after controlling 
for several factors that may affect IPO forecast reliability:11  
          FE (AFE) = α +β1REG +β2SIZE+β3FH+β4PEV+β5LEV+β6BIG5+β7RTO+β8GDP 
                               +β9STE + Industry dummies + ε                                                 (3) 
where 
               FE    = Forecast error, 
           AFE     = Absolute forecast error,  
           REG    = the CSRC Regulation No. 12-1996, 
           SIZE    = Firm size,  
           FH       = Forecast horizon,  
           PEV     = Past earnings variability,  
           LEV     = Financial leverage,  
           BIG5    = Big Five auditor, 
            RTO    = Retention ownership, 
            GDP   = GDP growth rate, 
            STE     = Stock exchange.        
           The test variable (REG) equals to “1” if a firm went public after the end of 1996 and 
“0” if before the end of 1996.  The control variables are defined as follows.  Firm size (SIZE) 
is measured as the logarithm value of total assets at the end of the IPO year.  Forecast horizon 
                                                 
11
          The pooled regression does not lead to any serial correlations because each firm has only one 
observation in the sample.  
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(FH) is measured as the number of months between the forecast date and the end of the IPO 
year.  If the forecast date belongs to the first (second) half of a month, that month is (not) 
counted when calculating forecast horizon.12  Past earnings variability (PEV) is computed by 
dividing the standard deviation of earnings across the three years prior to the IPO year by the 
mean of the three years’ earnings (Cheng & Firth, 2000; Lonkani & Firth, 2005).  Financial 
leverage (LEV) is measured by the total liabilities over the total assets at the end of the IPO 
year.  Big Five auditor (BIG5) is coded “1” if the auditor is a Big Five firm and “0” 
otherwise.  Retention ownership (RTO) is the percentage of total equity retained by extant 
owners after the initial public offering.  GDP growth rate (GDP) is yearly Gross Domestic 
Product growth rate.  The stock exchange dummy (STE) is coded “1” if a firm is listed on the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange and “0” if listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange.  Industry 
dummies are coded “1” if there are at least 10 sample firms from an industry and “0” 
otherwise.13 
            We include the control variables in the regression model based on the literature.  Prior 
research considers firm size as a potential factor affecting earnings forecast accuracy.  For 
instance, Hagerman and Ruland (1979) suggest that larger firms can produce more accurate 
forecasts because they are more diversified and thus are better able to survive economic 
changes than smaller firms.  Cox (1995) argues that larger firms have adequate human 
resources to prepare high-quality forecasts and a stable earnings process in which earnings 
                                                 
12
           For example, the forecast horizon for a firm that went public on 06/14/1997 is 7 months, and the 
forecast horizon for a firm that went public on 08/16/1996 is 4 months.  The fiscal year end is December 31 for 
all Chinese companies.  
13
           All continuous variables in the model are winsorized at 1% and 99%. 
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are more predictable.  Larger firms may also have better control over their market settings, 
and thus may be less susceptible to economic fluctuations (Firth & Smith, 1992). 
            It has been argued that an important determinant of forecast reliability is forecast 
horizon.  A negative association between forecast horizon and forecast accuracy is reported 
in earlier U.S. studies (Collins & Hopwood, 1980; Brown, Foster, & Noreen, 1985).  As 
earnings forecast is an inherently uncertain process, the longer the forecast horizon the 
greater the possibility that unexpected events may occur.  Additionally, forecasts developed 
on a date close to the end of the forecast period may incorporate more updated information 
and thus are more reliable. 
           Another potential determinant of forecast reliability is past earnings variability.  Porter 
(1982) documents a negative association between past earnings variability and forecast 
accuracy in the U.S.   As past earnings data are usually used as inputs to the forecasting 
process, it might be more difficult to forecast earnings if past data show a large variation 
across different years.  In addition, the performance of a firm is usually sensitive to local and 
global market conditions, interest rate movements, exchange rate movements, etc.  The 
effects of these factors on a firm’s future performance might be incorporated in past earnings 
variability (Eddy & Seifert, 1992).  
            A firm’s financial leverage may also affect its forecast reliability.  Clarkson (2000) 
finds significant evidence that earnings forecasts are less accurate for firms with high 
leverage in Canada although the results are sensitive to alternative specifications.  Eddy and 
Seifert (1992) suggest that higher leverage may make earnings forecasting more difficult 
because firms with relatively high debt levels are likely to experience more volatile earnings.  
Francis, Philbrick, and Schipper (1998) find that even a modest decline in sales relative to 
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management’s expectations is likely to result in a large earnings shortfall for firms with high 
financial leverage. 
            IPO earnings forecasts are required to be audited by certified public accountants in 
China.  Simunic and Stein (1987) argue that Big Five accounting firms produce high-quality 
audits.  Big Five firms should have a strong incentive to provide high quality services in 
order to maintain their good reputations (DeAngelo, 1981; Healy & Lys, 1986).  Hartnett and 
Romcke (2000) and Cheng and Firth (2000) find that auditor quality is positively associated 
with IPO forecast accuracy in Australia and Hong Kong, respectively.  Thus, we include 
BIG5 in the model. 
            Retention ownership may also relate to the reliability of IPO forecasts.  Keasey and 
McGuinness (1991) argue that firms with a lower level of equity retention may inflate their 
earnings forecasts in order to maximize the issuance proceeds.  Further, an entrepreneur who 
retains less equity may be less concerned with a firm’s adverse reputation resulted from 
inaccurate earnings forecasts.  In addition, firms with a higher level of retention may have 
less variation in financial performance compared to firms with a lower level of retention, 
because the former is less affected by expansion of their scales.  Consistently, El-Rajabi and 
Gunasekaran (2006) find significant evidence on the positive association between retention 
ownership and forecast accuracy in Jordan.  
            Finally, we add GDP growth rate for the IPO year in the model to control for the 
effect of general economic conditions on forecast reliability.  We also include a stock 
exchange dummy in the model.  To control for fixed industry effects, we include industry 
dummies in the model.  
 16 
           We expect a positive and significant coefficient on REG for the model with forecast 
error (FE) as dependent variable if H1 is supported.   We also expect a negative and 
significant coefficient on REG for the model with absolute forecast error (AFE) as dependent 
variable if H2 is supported.   
 
5.         Empirical Results 
            Table 2, panel A reports the distribution of forecast errors for the sample of 858 IPO 
earnings forecasts.  Table 2, panel B presents the distribution of optimistic earnings forecasts 
across years.  We find that 49.41% of the 858 forecasts were overestimated, whereas 50.59% 
of the forecasts were underestimated.  The distribution of forecast errors for Chinese IPO 
earnings forecasts seems fairly symmetric.  About 55% of the sample firms have forecast 
errors in a range between -10% and +10%, compared to  8% of Australian forecasts 
(Hartnett, 1993), 45.97% of Malaysian forecasts (Jelic et al., 1998), and 4.9% of Jordanian 
forecasts (El-Rajabi & Gunasekaran, 2006).  About 75% of the sample firms have forecast 
errors in a range between -20% and +20%, compared to 55% of Canadian forecasts (Pedwell 
et al., 1994), 19% of New Zealand forecasts (Firth & Smith, 1992), and 7.3% of Jordanian 
forecasts (El-Rajabi & Gunasekaran, 2006).  Moreover, about 0.8% of the sample firms have 
forecast errors beyond the range of -100% to +100%, compared to 53% of Australian 
forecasts (Hartnett, 1993) and 39.0% of Jordanian forecasts (El-Rajabi & Gunasekaran, 
2006). 
Insert Table 2 about here 
            Table 3, panel A reports the descriptive statistics on forecast bias and forecast 
accuracy of Chinese IPO earnings forecasts.  The mean forecast error and mean absolute 
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forecast error are 0.45% and 15.28%, respectively, for the full sample.  Comparatively, the 
mean absolute forecast error is 289% for Australian forecasts (Hartnett, 1993), 100% for 
New Zealand forecasts (Mak, 1989), 88% for Canadian forecasts (Pedwell et al., 1994), 
163.4% for Jordanian forecasts (El-Rajabi & Gunasekaran, 2006), 35.76% for Thailand 
forecasts (Lonkani & Firth, 2005), 27.91% for Malaysian forecasts (Mohamad, Nassir, 
Kuing, & Ariff, 1994), 18% for Hong Kong forecasts (Chan, Sit, Tong, Wong, & Chan, 
1996), 11% for British forecasts (Keasey & McGuiness, 1991), and 10.4% for Singaporean 
forecasts (Firth, Kwok, Liau-Tan, & Yeo, 1995).  Our findings suggest that Chinese IPO 
forecast errors are moderate compared to other countries, consistent with the evidence 
provided by Chen and Firth (1999).14  
Insert Table 3 about here 
            Table 3, panel A also reports that the mean and median forecast error are 1.60% and 
0.18%, respectively, after the end of 1996, compared to -1.55% and 0.05%, respectively, 
before the end of 1996.  The mean and median absolute forecast error are 14.46% and 8.31%, 
respectively, after the end of 1996, compared to 16.72% and 9.89%, respectively, before the 
end of 1996.  Table 3, panel B provides evidence on univariate tests of the two hypotheses.  
Both t-test and Wilcoxon test show that earnings forecasts are significantly less optimistic 
after the promulgation of the Regulation than before (t-statistic = 1.97 and z-statistic = 2.09, 
respectively), consistent with H1.  The univariate tests also show that earnings forecasts are 
significantly more accurate after the promulgation of the Regulation than before (t-statistic = 
-1.80 and z-statistic = -1.55, respectively), consistent with H2.  These results suggest that the 
                                                 
14
           In addition, Chen and Firth (1999) find that earnings forecasts in Chinese IPO prospectuses are more 
accurate than time series extrapolations of historical earnings. 
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CSRC Regulation No. 12-1996 enhances the credibility of earnings forecasts contained in 
Chinese IPO prospectuses.  
Insert Table 4 about here 
            Table 4, panel A tabulates the descriptive statistics on the independent variables used 
in the regression analysis.  Table 4, panel B reports Pearson correlations among the 
independent variables.  As the correlation between REG and GDP is highly negative (r =       
-0.76), we first conduct collinearity diagnostics for the regression analysis.  We find that the 
components associated with a high condition index (i.e., greater than 30) do not contribute 
strongly to the variance of two or more variables (i.e., variance proportion greater than about 
0.5).  Thus, multicollinearity is not a substantive issue when both REG and GDP are included 
in the regression model. 
            Table 5 presents the results of the regression analysis.  Table 5, columns 2 and 3 
report the results on testing H1.  We find that REG is positive and significant (t-statistic = 
3.31), consistent with H1.  Thus, results from the univariate tests of H1 still hold after adding 
control variables in the regression model.  Our findings suggest that the CSRC Regulation 
No. 12-1996 mitigates the overestimation of earnings forecasts in Chinese IPO prospectuses.  
In addition, we find that the coefficient on LEV is significantly negative (t-statistic = -1.61), 
suggesting that IPO firms with higher financial leverage issued more optimistic earnings 
forecasts than IPO firms with lower financial leverage.     
           Table 5, columns 4 and 5 report the results on testing H2.  We find a negative and 
significant coefficient on REG (t-statistic = -1.71), consistent with H2.   Hence, results 
obtained from the univariate tests of H2 still hold after we control for potential confounding 
effects in the regression.  Overall, the regression analysis provides further evidence that the 
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CSRC Regulation No. 12-1996 enhances the accuracy of earnings forecasts in Chinese IPO 
prospectuses.   
Insert Table 5 about here 
            In addition, we find that the coefficient on forecast horizon (FH) is significantly 
positive (t-statistic = 6.98), consistent with the studies in Canada (Davidson & Neu, 1993; 
Clarkson, 2000), New Zealand (Mak, 1989), the U.K. (Keasey & McGuinness, 1991), 
Australia (Hartnett, 1993), Singapore (Firth et al., 1995), and Thailand (Lonkani & Firth, 
2005).  This finding suggests that Chinese IPO earnings forecasts with shorter horizon are 
more accurate than those with longer horizon.  Also, past earnings variability (PEV) is 
positively associated with absolute forecast error (t-statistic = 1.96), consistent with a Hong 
Kong study by Chan et al. (1996).  Thus, Chinese IPO firms with lower past earnings 
variability issue more accurate earnings forecasts than those with higher past earnings 
variability.  Moreover, we find that financial leverage (LEV) is positively associated with 
absolute forecast error (t-statistic = 1.82), suggesting that Chinese IPO earnings forecasts 
with higher financial leverage are less accurate than those with lower financial leverage.  
Finally, we document a negative and significant coefficient on retention ownership (RTO) (t-
statistic = -1.43), consistent with a Jordanian study by El-Rajabi and Gunasekaran (2006).  
Thus, Chinese IPO earnings forecasts are more accurate for firms with higher ownership 
retention than for those with lower ownership retention.  
 
6.         Additional Analyses 
We also conduct additional analyses as follows.  First, we examine whether the 
results of our regression analysis are sensitive to using alternative measures of forecast bias 
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and accuracy.  We consider five different ways to calculate FE and AFE by using (1) 
absolute actual earnings (Cheng & Firth, 2000), (2) total assets (Hartnett, 2006), (3) sales, (4) 
book value of common equity, or (5) market value of common equity as the denominator in 
the formulae of FE and AFE, respectively.  Table 6 reports the results on the alternative 
measures of forecast reliability.  We find that earnings forecasts have been significantly less 
optimistic after the promulgation of the CSRC Regulation No. 12-1996, regardless of which 
alternative measure is used ( t-statistic = 3.83, 3.49, 2.82, 3.64, and 2.13, respectively).  We 
also find that forecast accuracy, as measured by one of the five different ways, has been 
significantly higher after the promulgation of the Regulation (t-statistic =-3.14, -4.45, -3.97,  
-4.53, and -1.34, respectively).  Thus, our results are not sensitive to the use of alternative 
proxies for forecast reliability.  
Insert Table 6 about here 
Second, we examine whether earnings forecasts being less optimistic after 1996 was 
due to management’s overstatement of ex post earnings realization rather than the impact of 
the Regulation on management’s ex ante forecasting behaviour.  As firms will be penalized 
by the CSRC if their IPO earnings forecasts are overstated, management may feel more 
pressure to manage IPO year’s actual earnings to meet their pre-IPO forecasts.  We measure 
earnings management as the ratio of the absolute value of accruals to the absolute value of 
cash flow from operations (Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki, 2003),  and add this measure in eq. 
(3) to control for the effects of earnings management on IPO forecast bias and accuracy.  We 
find that REG is positively associated with forecast error and is negatively associated with 
absolute forecast error (non-tabulated t-statistic = 3.32 and -1.71), consistent with our results 
reported earlier in the text.  In addition, we use actual earnings for the year prior to the IPO 
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instead of actual earnings for the IPO year in computing forecast error.   We document that 
the mean and median forecast error were -11.27% and -13.17%, respectively, in 1997, and 
were -30.12% and -30.86%, respectively, in 1996.  Both t-test and Wilcoxon test show that 
earnings forecasts were significantly less optimistic in 1997 than in 1996 (non-tabulated t-
statistic = 6.42 and z-statistic = 7.67, respectively).  These results suggest that the less 
optimistic IPO earnings forecasts in 1997 were not resulted from management’s 
overstatement of ex post earnings realization to meet their pre-IPO forecasts.   
            Third, we examine whether earnings forecast being more reliable after the Regulation 
is confounded by the development of market infrastructure such as the accumulation of 
investors’ knowledge and experience, the development of institutional investors, and the 
improvement in information disclosure environment.  We conduct three tests to address this 
concern.  We first compare forecast reliability for IPOs before 1996 and IPOs in 1996 by 
estimating eq. (3).  We find that forecast bias was not different for the two sub-periods (non-
tabulated t-statistic = 0.06), whereas IPO earnings forecasts were less accurate in 1996 than 
before 1996 (non-tabulated t-statistic = 1.98).  These findings suggest that Chinese IPO 
forecast reliability had not been improved before the promulgation of the Regulation at the 
end of 1996.   We then estimate eq. (3) using IPO forecasts from 1996 and 1997 only.  
Compared to the regressions using several years’ data, this test is more likely to mitigate 
confounding effects as there are fewer changes in market infrastructure in a single year than 
in several years.  We find that earnings forecasts were significantly less optimistic in 1997 
than in 1996 (non-tabulated t-statistic = 4.00), although forecast accuracy was not 
significantly improved in 1997 than in 1996 (non-tabulated t-statistic = -0.98).  To control for 
the effects of forecast bias, we run regression for absolute forecast error by including forecast 
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error in eq. (3).  We find that forecast accuracy was significantly higher in 1997 than in 1996 
(non-tabulated t-statistic = -1.87), suggesting that the insignificant change in forecast 
accuracy from 1996 to 1997 before controlling for forecast error could be due to IPO firms’ 
over-conservative forecasting in 1997.  Moreover, we estimate eq. (3) by adding two market-
wide variables for each year.  Specifically, we use the correlation coefficient between 
earnings and stock return for all listed firms in each year to reflect changes in information 
disclosure environment (Frankel, Kothari, & Weber, 2006).  We also use the ratio of market 
value of common shares held by all institutional investors over the total market capitalization 
in each year to reflect the development in institutional investors.  We find that, consistent 
with our findings reported earlier, IPO earnings forecasts are less optimistic and more 
accurate after the promulgation of the CSRC Regulation No. 12-1996 (non-tabulated t-
statistic = 4.37 and -1.40, respectively).  Overall, these three tests provide evidence 
supporting that IPO forecast reliability being more reliable after the Regulation is not 
confounded by changes in market infrastructure.   
            Fourth, we examine whether IPO earnings forecasts being less optimistic in 1997 was 
driven by the Asian Financial Crisis.  We compare forecast error for IPOs in 1996 with IPOs 
in the first half of 1997 as the Asian Financial Crisis started with the collapse of the Thai 
currency market on July 2, 1997 (Jeon & Seo, 2003).  Of the 172 IPOs in 1997, 125 
companies went public in the first half of 1997 (i.e., before the Asian Financial Crisis).  By 
estimating eq. (3) for forecast error using IPOs in 1996 and IPOs in the first half of 1997, we 
find that IPO earnings forecasts were less optimistic for the first half of 1997 than for 1996 
(non-tabulated t-statistic = 3.88).  This finding suggests that IPO earnings forecasts being less 
optimistic in 1997 was not driven by the Asian Financial Crisis.   
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            Fifth, we examine the determinants of forecast accuracy before and after the 
promulgation of the CSRC Regulation No. 12-1996 separately.  For the period before the 
promulgation, we find that forecast horizon and past earnings variability are significantly 
positively associated with absolute forecast error (non-tabulated t-statistic = 4.15 and 1.42, 
respectively).  For the period after the promulgation, we find that forecast horizon, financial 
leverage, and Big Five auditor are significantly positively associated with absolute forecast 
error (non-tabulated t-statistic = 4.89, 2.07, and 1.88, respectively).  These results suggest a 
temporal change in the pattern of the determinants of forecast accuracy.  
            Sixth, we examine whether shifting from mandatory to voluntary disclosure of 
earnings forecasts affects IPO earnings forecast reliability after March 15, 2001.  In our 
sample, only 54 IPO firms voluntarily disclosed earnings forecasts after March 15, 2001, and 
we compare forecast reliability for these 54 firms with the 134 firms that mandatorily issued 
earnings forecasts between January 1, 2000 and March 15, 2001.15  We find that there is no 
significant difference in either forecast bias or forecast accuracy between voluntary and 
mandatory disclosure.  We also examine the determinants of forecast accuracy for the 54 
firms with voluntary disclosure.  We find that forecast horizon, financial leverage, and Big 
Five auditor are significantly positively associated with absolute forecast error (non-tabulated 
t-statistic = 1.36, 1.84, and 2.31, respectively), and retention ownership is negatively 
associated with absolute forecast error (non-tabulated t-statistic = -1.36). 
           Finally, we examine whether IPOs were more underpricing for 1997 than for 1996.  If 
the enactment of the CSRC Regulation No. 12-1996 constrains managerial motivation in 
                                                 
15
           Eight out of the 134 firms issued IPO earnings forecasts between January 1 and March 15, 2001.  
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overstating forecasts for increasing offer price, IPOs would be more underpricing for 1997 
than for 1996.  We estimate the following model to test this conjecture:  
          UDP = α +β1REG +β2SIZE+β3PRCD+β4PEV+β5LEV+β6BIG5+β7RTO+β8ROA 
                          + Industry dummies + ε                                                             (4) 
where UDP is IPO underpricing, measured as first-day closing price minus offer price 
divided by offer price.  REG is coded “1” for IPOs in 1997 and “0” for IPOs in 1996.  PRCD 
is IPO proceeds, computed as the logarithm value of IPO proceeds.  ROA is return on assets, 
measured as net income deflated by total assets.  Based on prior research (e.g., Beatty, 1989; 
Willenborg, 1999; Willenborg & McKeown, 2001), we include control variables in eq. (4) to 
control for company size (SIZE), issue size (PRCD), risk (PEV and LEV), auditor reputation 
(BIG5), retention ownership (RTO), and profitability (ROA).  We expect a positive and 
significant coefficient for REG if IPOs were more underpricing for 1997 than for 1996.   
Insert Table 7 about here 
            Table 7 presents results on the changes in IPO underpricing from 1996 to 1997.  We 
find that the coefficient on REG is positive and significant (t-statistic = 1.36).  Thus, IPOs 
were more underpricing for 1997 than for 1996.  Our results suggest that managers were less 
motivated to exaggerate earnings forecasts for setting offer price after the enactment of the 
CSRC Regulation No. 12-1996.  In addition, we document that IPO underpricing is 
positively associated with IPO proceeds and audit quality (t-statistic = 6.78 and 3.33, 
respectively), and is negatively associated with firm size and return on assets (t-statistic =  
-8.75 and -5.74, respectively). 
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7.         Conclusion 
            This study examines whether the CSRC Regulation No. 12-1996, Announcement of 
Some Rules on the Issuance of Shares, can mitigate the overestimation of earnings forecasts 
and improve forecast accuracy in Chinese IPO prospectuses.  We find that IPO earnings 
forecasts have been less optimistic after the Regulation was promulgated on December 26, 
1996.  We also find that forecast accuracy has been significantly improved by the Regulation.  
Overall, the CSRC Regulation No. 12-1996 can enhance the forecast reliability of IPO 
earnings forecasts.  
            Meanwhile, this study provides evidence on the determinants of Chinese IPO forecast 
accuracy.  We find that forecast horizon, past earnings variability, and financial leverage are 
positively associated with absolute forecast error, and retention ownership is negatively 
associated with absolute forecast error.   
            This study has three contributions to the literature.  First, to the best of our 
knowledge, no other studies in the literature have been conducted to examine the effects of 
securities administrators’ regulations on the reliability of management earnings forecasts.  
Second, our findings may provide implications for future regulation promulgation to the 
CSRC and other securities regulators in emerging markets.  Third, this study suggests some 
ex ante criteria for evaluating Chinese earnings forecast accuracy.    
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Table 1  
Distribution of sample firms 
   
Panel A. By year 
 
Year Frequency Percent (%) 
1991 1 0.12 
1992 36 4.20 
1993 72 8.39 
1994 22 2.56 
1995 12 1.40 
1996 170 19.81 
1997 172 20.05 
1998 95 11.07 
1999 90 10.49 
2000 126 14.69 
2001 37 4.31 
2002 18 2.10 
2003 3 0.35 
2004 3 0.35 
2005 1 0.12 
Total 858 100.00 
   
Panel B. By CSRC industry 
 
Industry Frequency Percent (%) 
Agriculture, forestry, poultry, and fishing    23 2.68 
Mining 16 1.86 
Manufacture 507 59.09 
Utilities 34 3.96 
Construction 11 1.28 
Transportation and storage 31 3.61 
Information technology 53 6.18 
Wholesale and retail 55 6.41 
Finance and insurance 3 0.35 
Real estate 36 4.20 
Social service 31 3.61 
Media and communication 5 0.58 
Conglomerate 53 6.18 
Total 858 100.00 
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Table 2 
Distribution of forecast error  
 
Panel A. Full sample  
        
Forecast Error Frequency Percent (%) Cumulative Percent (%) 
≤-1 2 0.23 0.23 
(-1   , -0.5] 17 1.98 2.21 
(-0.5, -0.2] 83 9.67 11.89 
(-0.2, -0.1] 96 11.19 23.07 
(-0.1,     0] 226 26.34 49.41 
( 0   ,  0.1] 244 28.44 77.85 
( 0.1,  0.2] 74 8.62 86.48 
( 0.2 , 0.5] 86 10.02 96.50 
( 0.5 ,    1] 25 2.91 99.41 
>1 5 0.58 100.00 
Total 858 100.00 - 
    
Panel B. By year 
        
Year  Optimistic forecast Total forecast Percent (%) 
1991 0 1 0.00 
1992 19 36 52.78 
1993 21 72 29.17 
1994 12 22 54.55 
1995 4 12 33.33 
1996 97 170 57.06 
1997 63 172 36.63 
1998 49 95 51.58 
1999 59 90 65.56 
2000 62 126 48.41 
2001 23 37 62.16 
2002 12 18 66.67 
2003 2 3 66.67 
2004 1 3 33.33 
2005 0 1 0.00 
Total 424 858 49.41 
    
Forecast error (FE) is calculated as follows: 
                         FE = (A – F ) / │F│                                                                                                      (1) 
               where  
                         F = Earnings forecast, 
                         A = Actual earnings. 
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Table 3 
Univariate analysis 
   
Panel A. Descriptive statistics 
                
   FE   AFE  
Period N Mean Median Std Mean Median Std 
Full sample 858 0.45% 0.08% 0.226 15.28% 8.90% 0.177 
Before regulation 313 -1.55% 0.05% 0.243 16.72% 9.89% 0.186 
After regulation 545 1.60% 0.18% 0.215 14.46% 8.31% 0.171 
        
Panel B. t-tests and Wilcoxon tests 
   
Test FE AFE 
t-statistic 1.97** -1.80** 
z-statistic 2.09**                                           -1.55* 
   
“Before regulation” and “After regulation” refer to whether an IPO earnings forecast was issued before or after 
the promulgation of the CSRC Regulation No.12-1996  
FE is forecast error defined in table 2. 
AFE is absolute forecast error defined as follows: 
                          AFE = │A – F│ / │F │                                                                                                (2) 
              where  
                         F = Earnings forecast, 
           A = Actual earnings. 
** Significant at the level of 5% (one-tailed). 
*   Significant at the level of 10% (one-tailed). 
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Table 4  
Descriptive statistics and Pearson correlations of independent variables  
   
Panel A. Descriptive statistics 
       
Variable N Mean Median Std Q1 Q3 
REG 858 0.64 1.00 0.482 0.00 1.00 
SIZE 858 11.22 11.14 0.872 10.68 11.67 
FH 858 5.60 6.00 3.025 3.00 8.00 
PEV 858 0.33 0.26 0.250 0.15 0.44 
LEV 858 0.36 0.36 0.149 0.24 0.46 
BIG5 858 0.08 0.00 0.265 0.00 0.00 
RTO 858 0.68 0.68 0.108 0.61 0.75 
GDP 858 0.09 0.09 0.020 0.08 0.10 
STE 858 0.59 1.00 0.493 0.00 1.00 
       
Panel B. Pearson correlations (n=858) 
         
Variable SIZE FH PEV LEV BIG5 RTO GDP STE 
REG 0.39*** 0.21*** -0.23*** -0.22*** -0.16*** -0.11*** -0.76*** -0.04 
SIZE  0.06* -0.18*** 0.20*** 0.27*** 0.25*** -0.32***  0.03 
FH      -0.06* -0.02  -0.07**    -0.05 -0.11*** -0.02 
PEV    -0.03      0.04    -0.02 0.18***  0.06* 
LEV     0.04     0.05 0.12*** -0.04 
BIG5      0.40*** 0.24***  0.05 
RTO       0.20*** 0.15*** 
GDP               0.14*** 
         
REG is coded “1” if a firm went public after the end of 1996 and “0” if before the end of 1996. 
SIZE is measured by the logarithm value of total assets.  
FH is measured as the number of months between the forecast date and the end of the IPO year.  
PEV is computed by dividing the standard deviation of earnings across the three years prior to the IPO  
year by the mean of the three years’ earnings. 
LEV is measured by the total liabilities over the total assets.  
BIG5 is coded “1” if the auditor is a Big Five firm and “0” otherwise.  
RTO is the percentage of total equity retained by extant owners after the initial public offering.  
GDP is Gross Domestic Product growth rate. 
STE is coded “1” if a firm is listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and “0” if listed on the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange.  
*** Significant at the level of 1% (two-tailed). 
**   Significant at the level of 5% (two-tailed). 
*     Significant at the level of 10% (two-tailed). 
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Table 5 
Regression analysis  
      
                                                                       FE                                                    AFE 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept -0.107         -0.64 0.165      1.28 
REG 0.090 3.31*** -0.036         -1.71** 
SIZE -0.004        -0.35 -0.003     -0.29 
FH -0.002        -0.75 0.014 6.98*** 
PEV 0.041         1.28 0.048          1.96** 
LEV -0.092          -1.61* 0.080          1.82** 
BIG5 0.032         0.93 0.032      1.20 
RTO -0.068        -0.83 -0.090       -1.43* 
GDP 1.707 2.69*** -0.173     -0.36 
STE -0.032             -2.01** -0.006      -0.46 
     
Industry dummies  Included  Included 
     
N                858         858 
F-statistic  1.59**  3.66*** 
Adj. R2                   1.36%            5.86% 
     
The regression model is as follows: 
     FE (AFE) = α+β1REG+β2SIZE+β3FH+β4PEV+β5LEV+β5BIG5+β6RTO+β8GDP+β9STE 
                   +Industry dummies + error                                                                                               (3)        
where the variables in equation (3) are defined in Tables 2, 3, and 4. 
*** Significant at the level of 1% (one-tailed). 
**   Significant at the level of 5% (one-tailed). 
*     Significant at the level of 10% (one-tailed). 
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Table 6 
Results on alternative measures of FE and AFE 
      
                                                                                FE                                                 AFE 
Denominator  Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Absolute actual earnings 0.150 3.83*** -0106 -3.14*** 
Total assets 0.008 3.49*** -0.008 -4.45*** 
Sales 0.016 2.82*** -0.018 -3.97*** 
Book value of common equity 0.014            3.64*** -0.014 -4.53*** 
Market value of common equity 0.005          2.13** -0.002    -1.34* 
     
Eq.(3) is estimated by using alternative measures of FE and AFE based on the denominator of absolute  
actual earnings, total assets, sales, book value of common equity, and market value of common equity, 
respectively, instead of absolute earnings forecast. 
*** Significant at the level of 1% (one-tailed). 
**   Significant at the level of 5% (one-tailed). 
*     Significant at the level of 10% (one-tailed). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 35 
 
Table 7 
IPO underpricing 
                                                                                                               
Variable Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept 1.199                                            1.68** 
REG 0.129                                          1.36* 
SIZE -0.507        -8.75*** 
PRCD 0.582        6.78*** 
PEV 0.137                                             0.95 
LEV -0.295                                      -1.02 
BIG5 0.647                                            3.33***              
RTO 0.406                                       1.12 
ROA -3.457 -5.74*** 
   
Industry dummies  Included 
   
N                                         340 
F-statistic  8.18*** 
Adj. R2                                           25.31% 
   
The regression model is as follows: 
               UDP = α +β1REG +β2SIZE+β3PRCD+β4PEV+β5LEV+β6BIG5+β7RTO+β8ROA 
                                  + Industry dummies + error                                                             (2) 
where UDP is IPO underpricing, measured as first-day closing price minus offer price divided by offer  
price.  REG is coded “1” for IPOs in 1997 and “0” for IPOs in 1996.  PRCD is IPO proceeds, computed 
as the logarithm value of IPO proceeds.  ROA is return on assets, measured as net income deflated by total 
assets.  Other variables in eq. (4) are defined in Table 4. 
*** Significant at the level of 1% (one-tailed). 
**   Significant at the level of 5% (one-tailed). 
*     Significant at the level of 10% (one-tailed). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
